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COGNITIVE BIAS AND ADOLESCENT RISK-TAKING 
 
Mayuko Nakamura 
64 Pages 
Although the framing effect (i.e., the tendency of people to react differently to a 
particular choice depending on whether the choice is presented as a loss or as a gain) is a well-
established cognitive bias among the adult population, there have been a limited number of 
studies with adolescent samples. In the present study, high school students (14-18) and college 
students (18-26) were asked to make choices in several decision problems including the classic 
Asian Disease Problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) and modified “adolescent-relevant” 
versions that are applicable to the real-world experiences of adolescents. Individual difference 
measures, including rational and experiential thinking styles, impulsivity, and personality (i.e., 
neuroticism and openness to new experiences) were also measured to analyze whether these 
constructs moderate individual susceptibility to framing effects. The present study demonstrated 
that high school students were less susceptible to the college students compared to the adults. 
Adolescent-relevant scenarios did not yield statistically significant difference in risky choices; 
however, a trend was found in that the 12th graders made most risky choices in these scenarios 
compared to 9th graders or college students. As for individual differences, rational thinking style 
moderated the susceptibility to framing effects. College students with moderate and high 
Rational Thinking scores were most susceptible to the framing effect. There was also a large 
framing effect for high school students in the low rational thinking group. Although the present 
study benefited from the strengths from within-subject design that allows comparisons of 
individual level differences, fatigue effects from answering similar experimental questions might 
have affected the results of the study. Future studies may want to address this issue by varying 
the order of experimental tasks. 
KEYWORDS: Adolescent, Decision-Making, Risky Choices, Biases, Framing, Individual 
Differences 
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CHAPTER I: STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Adolescence is an important time period when people face a number of critical decisions 
including friendship, sexuality, healthy life styles, drug and alcohol use, future goals, and careers 
(Steinberg, 2010). Many of these decisions – such as those involving drugs, alcohol, and sexual 
behaviors – involve risks that often have long-term physical and psychological implications. 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has conducted a survey of ninth 
through twelfth grade students using the Youth Behavior Surveillance System since 1990. The 
primary purpose of the survey is to monitor health risk behaviors that contribute significantly to 
the leading causes of death, disability, and social problems in the United States. These health 
risks, such as risky sexual behaviors, substance use, unhealthy dietary behaviors, and inadequate 
physical activity are often established during adolescence. According to the most recent survey 
results, 66.2% of ninth through twelfth grade students have had at least one drink of alcohol, 
40.7% have used marijuana, 41.1% have used cigarettes, and 40.9% of sexually active 
adolescents surveyed did not use condoms (Kann et al., 2014). Thus, risky behaviors are 
prevalent among the adolescent population; therefore, it is important for developmental 
psychologists to study the risky behaviors of adolescents in order to help policy makers, schools, 
educators, and health practitioners to implement effective preventative measures.  
The majority of studies on adolescent risk-taking behaviors have been conducted in the 
form of self-report surveys (see Reyna & Farley, 2006 for a review). Although it is important to 
consider various factors that could predict adolescents’ risk-taking behaviors, the correlational 
nature of survey methods may not lead to any strong inferences about the mechanism(s) of risky 
decision-making processes. Understanding the mechanisms of risky decision-making processes, 
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with the support of a strong theoretical framework, is necessary in order to create effective 
intervention and prevention programs for adolescents (Rivers, Reyna, & Mills, 2008).   
Unfortunately, research on decision-making processes has largely been “adevelopmental” 
(Albert & Steinberg, 2011). That is, although a number of studies have been conducted using 
adult samples, especially with college student samples, the majority of studies have not explored 
the developmental trajectory of decision-making processes. In the current study, I examine 
adolescent risky decision making using framing effects paradigm. The framing effect is one of 
the well-studied cognitive biases. People tend to make different decisions depending on whether 
equivalent options are presented (or “framed”) as either a loss or as a gain. In my review of the 
literature, I start with the adult decision-making literature to give an overview of the theoretical 
frameworks. I discuss relevant experimental findings about framing effects. I then discuss the 
developmental implications for risky decision-making processes during adolescence. 
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CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Dual-Processing Accounts of Judgment and Decision-Making 
Literature in the field of judgment and decision-making has analyzed decision-making 
processes using a variety of information-processing theories as the conceptual frameworks. 
Among cognitive and social psychology models, dual-process theories have recently gained 
acceptance by researchers in the field as a solid construct to explain various mental processes 
from social biases to learning to decision-making (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Evans, 2003; 
Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Stanovich & West, 2000). Although the terminologies 
or distinctions of the processes may be different (Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2011), dual-
process theories in general propose that there are two different kinds of mental processing: one 
that is fast, automatic, intuitive, and experiential; and another that is slow, deliberate, analytic, 
and rational (Kahneman, 2011). In spite of the wide acceptance of the dual process perspective, 
researchers have not agreed on the terminologies for these systems, using a variety of contrasting 
sets of terms such as System 1 versus System 2 (Evans, 2003; Kahneman & Fredrick, 2002), 
Type 1 and Type 2 processing (Evans, 2008, Stanovich et al., 2011), experiential versus rational 
(Epstein, 1994), associative versus rule-based (Sloman, 1996), intuitive versus analytic (Reyna & 
Brainerd, 2011) and so on. Moreover, there has been discussion as to whether these represent 
types of processes or different systems (for extended discussion see Keren & Schul, 2009). 
Discussion on the most accurately represented sets of terminology is out of scope of this study; 
thus, for the sake of the discussion below, I use the terms experiential and analytical as adopted 
by Slovic et al. (2005), and will refer to these as types of processing because it implies less rigid 
structures, and there is thus far little evidence in support of separate cognitive systems (Keren & 
Schul, 2009).  
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Developmental Views of Dual-Processing Theories in Adolescent Decision-Making  
Traditional judgement and decision-making literature builds on a normative view of 
rational decision making (Albert & Stenberg, 2011) and claims that analytical processing yields 
“better” results by overriding the intuitive decisions made via experiential processing (Evans, 
2003, Klaczynski, 2005, Stanovich, 1999). Stanovich and colleagues (2011) explain that in this 
view, experiential processing may produce responses that are “non-optimal” in particular 
contexts if they are not overridden by analytical processing. Many of these claims come from the 
heuristics and biases literature (see Evans, 2003 for review), which focuses on documenting and 
explaining the various types of reasoning failures as being the result of intuitive decisions. 
Developmental researchers who have subscribed to the normative view of rational decision-
making mainly focus on examining aspects of rational cognitive processes in which adolescents 
were deficient relative to adults; in this view, the developmental path is seen as a simple 
transition from experiential to analytical processing (Albert & Stenberg, 2011). However, more 
recent adolescent research that is based on dual-process theories considers the developmental 
course as an increase in both analytical and experiential processing, and posits that adolescents 
use more experiential processing than analytical processing in social contexts that activates their 
increasingly rich social schemas (Albert & Stenberg, 2011). 
Fuzzy-trace theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995) is one of the dual-process theories that tries 
to explain the developmental path where both analytical and experiential processing increase as 
cognitive development progresses. In fuzzy-trace theory, one type of processing uses simple, gist 
mental representations (gist-based processing) and the other type of processing uses detailed, 
quantitative mental representations (verbatim-based processing). When a comparison is made 
between fuzzy-trace theory and traditional dual process theories, it is explained that gist-based 
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processing in fuzzy-trace theory heavily relies on experiential processing whereas verbatim-
based processing relies on analytical processing. However, fuzzy-trace theory posits that 
advanced judgment and decision-making is based on gist-based processing (i.e., experiential 
processing) as opposed to verbatim-based processing (i.e., analytical processing). Thus, fuzzy-
trace theory presents an opposite view from the normative view of rational reasoning. In terms of 
developmental progression, a fuzzy-trace theory account suggests that decision-making becomes 
less “analytical” and more “experiential” as development progresses. Additionally, proponents of 
fuzzy-trace theory consider heuristics, biases, and cognitive inconsistencies as a side effect of 
advanced gist-based processing, that is, children and adolescents become more prone to 
heuristics and biases because they have become better at experiential processing with age (Reyna 
et al., 2005; Rivers et al., 2008). Although the proponent of fuzzy trace theory and other dual 
processing theorists are trying to explain the developmental path with various experiments on 
cognitive biases, studies have not uniformly found the patterns of increase in experiential 
processing (Evans, 2001; Klaczynski, 2002; Stanovich, Toplak & West, 2008).   
Framing Effects 
Of the many well-known cognitive biases, the framing effect is widely studied in many 
fields, including economics, psychology, healthcare, and businesses (see Levin, Schneider & 
Gaeth, 1998 for review). The framing effect is the robust tendency for people to make different 
decisions depending on whether (equivalent) options are presented (or “framed”) as either a loss 
or as a gain. Choices presented in terms of gains tend to elicit risk-averse behaviors, whereas 
choices presented in terms of losses tend to elicit risk-taking behaviors (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981). The framing effect was originally demonstrated by Tversky and Kahneman (1981, p. 453) 
in their famous “Asian Disease Problem” (see Figure 1). 
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In their original study, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) found that although the expected 
value of Programs A and B, and Programs C and D are equal, when the problem was presented 
with outcomes in the gain frame (i.e., in terms of lives saved; Problem 1), the majority of the 
participants (72%) chose Program A, the sure (non-probabilistic) option; therefore, considered 
risk-averse. They also found that when the problem was presented with outcomes in the loss 
frame (e.g., life lost, Problem 2), only 22% picked the sure option. The majority of participants 
(78%) chose Program D, the risky/probabilistic option; therefore, considered more risk-taking. In 
short, the framing effect refers to people’s tendency to become risk-averse when facing potential 
gain and to become risk-taking when facing potential loss.  
Since Tversky and Kahneman’s original study, framing effects have been extensively 
studied. Research on framing effects began with studies that examined risk-averse tendencies in 
the gain frame and risk-taking tendencies in the loss frame in problem scenarios such as Asian 
Disease Problem and its variants, and gambling tasks (e.g., Frisch, 1993, Reyna & Brainerd, 
1991). The field quickly expanded to include studies that examine the effects of framing with a 
variety of negative and positive outcomes (e.g., Linville, Fischer, & Fischhoff, 1993; Marteau, 
1989; Wilson, Kaplan, & Schneiderman, 1987). Many studies were conducted to explore 
decision-making behaviors in various fields including healthcare, product marketing, and 
financial planning (see Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998, for review). The term “framing effect” 
became widely used in that different operational definitions and different underlining 
mechanisms were all discussed under this same umbrella term. 
Levin et al. (1998) created a typology of framing effects and classified studies into three 
categories: (a) risky framing, (b) attribute framing, and (c) goal framing effects. The risky 
framing effect refers to the standard tendency to prefer the sure option in a gain frame and the 
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risky (i.e., probabilistic) option in a loss frame (e.g., Asian Disease Problem, Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). The attribute framing effect refers to the tendency to give a better evaluation 
of an item when a key attribute is framed in positive rather than negative terms. For example, 
Levin and Gaeth (1988) found that consumers gave different judgement of the flavor of meat 
products based on how they were labeled (e.g., 75% lean ground beef for better tasting and less 
greasy than 25% fat ground beef). The goal framing effect refers to the differential impact of 
positive (i.e., the opportunity to make a gain or avoid a loss) or negative (i.e., the opportunity to 
make no gain or suffer a loss) framed messages. For example, Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) 
showed that women were more apt to perform breast self-examination (BSE) when presented 
with information stressing the negative consequences of not performing BSE than the positive 
consequences of performing BSE. 
Piñon and Gambara (2005) conducted a meta-analysis of 51 studies on framing effects 
and examined the effect sizes for research studies that fit the three different framing effect types. 
They found that risky framing and goal framing had moderate effect size (d = .437 for sure 
option vs. risky framing, and d = .444 for negative vs. positive goal framing) whereas studies of 
attribute framing had smaller effect sizes (d = .260 for the same item emphasizing positive vs. 
negative attributes). 
Kühberger (1998) also conducted a meta-analysis and instead classified framing effect 
studies by nine different types of cover stories (i.e., Asian Disease, Gambling, Tax evasion, 
Bargaining, Escalation of commitment, Game theory, Message compliance, Clinical reasoning, 
and Evaluation of objects). The Asian Disease cover story had the biggest effect size among all 
of those reviewed (d = .57). The gambling cover stories had the second biggest effect size (d = 
.43). Other cover stories, except for the Tax evasion (d = .42) cover story had very small effect 
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sizes (d = -.08 to .17). Thus, the various cover stories used to study the framing effect do not 
have an equal impact on choices made by participants.  
Thus, the results from the above meta-analyses by Piñon and Gambara (2005) and 
Kuhberger (1998) demonstrated that framing effects research does yield a consistent pattern of 
results and risky framing effects, especially with Asian-Disease scenarios, and that this type of 
problem has yielded bigger effect sizes. Thus, in the current proposed study, Asian-Disease-like 
scenarios will be used in exploration of the susceptibility of framing effects among adolescents. 
Framing Effects and Individual Differences 
Although these meta-analyses have explored the scenario characteristics and types of 
framing (Kühberger, 1998; Piñon & Gambara, 2005), a meta-analysis has thus far not been 
conducted to understand the relationship between the susceptibility to framing effects and 
individual differences. In order to apply the results of framing effects to real-life interventions of 
risky behaviors, it is important to understand individual characteristics of those who are 
susceptible to framing effects. 
Fagley and Miller (1990) examined the relationship among framing effects, gender, and 
risk-taking propensity. They used five variants of the Asian Disease Problem with different 
probabilities for the framing effects (e.g., 2/3, 1/2, 2/5, etc.) and studied the interaction among 
the problem scenarios, gender, and the composite scores from two risk-taking propensity 
measures: the Choice Dilemma Questionnaire (CDQ, Kogan & Wallach, 1964) and the Risk 
Avoidance Scale (RAS, Shure & Meeker, 1967). They concluded that women are more 
susceptible to framing effects, and risk-taking propensity was not a significant predictor of 
susceptibility to framing effects. 
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McElroy and Seta (2003) examined framing effects and their relationship with 
individuals’ thinking styles (i.e., analytic or holistic thinkers). They used a between-subject 
design where each participant was randomly assigned to one of the framing (gains/losses) 
condition. All participants took the Preference Test (PT; Zenhausern, 1978) before completing 
the Asian Disease Problem. The PT is a 20-item questionnaire to assess individuals’ cognitive 
style (analytic vs. holistic) preference. Based on the result of the PT, the participants were 
divided into analytic thinkers (top half) or holistic thinkers (bottom half). Although a significant 
framing effect (i.e., sure options for the gain frame and risky/probabilistic options for the loss 
frame) was found in the analysis of all participants, the effect was most pronounced for holistic 
thinkers. Especially, when the top 25% of PT and the bottom 25% of PT were compared, the 
framing effect was clearly demonstrated among those who were relatively extreme in holistic 
thinking style (bottom 25% of PT). It is interesting to note that the participants of this study were 
all female; therefore, it is unclear if the same pattern would be found in male participants. 
Fagley, Coleman, and Simon (2009) explored gender and perspective-taking ability as 
possible moderators of framing effects. They also employed a between-subject design where 
each participant was randomly assigned to one of the framing (gains/losses) conditions. Three 
variants of the Asian Disease Problem with 1/3 probability of the same expected value were 
given to the participants. In addition to the decision problems, each participant filled out two 
perspective-taking measures, the Multiple Perspectives Inventory (Gorenﬂo & Crano, 1998) to 
measure cognitive perspective-taking (CPT) ability and the Social Decentering Scale (Redmond, 
1995) to measure affective perspective-taking (APT) ability. They found a significant main 
effect of frames and significant interaction of frames, gender, CPT and APT. Further analysis 
examined frame, CPT, and APT for men and women separately. They found that men showed a 
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moderate framing effect, whereas women showed a more complex pattern in which framing 
effects were moderated by CPT and APT. Women higher in affective perspective-taking but 
lower in cognitive perspective-taking showed the largest framing effect (i.e., preference for sure 
options in the gain frame condition and preference for risky/probabilistic options in the loss 
frame condition). 
Shiloh, Salton, and Sharabi (2002) examined individual differences in rational and 
intuitive thinking styles as moderators of framing effects. They asked each participant to make 
choices between sure options and risky/probabilistic options in both loss and gain frames in five 
variants of the Asian Disease Problem. For individual difference measures, participants 
completed the Rational-Experiential inventory (REI; Epstein et al., 1995). Shiloh et al. analyzed 
the number of sure option selections as the dependent variable and frames, rational thinking 
style, and intuitive thinking style as independent variables. They found a three-way interaction of 
intuitive thinking style, rational thinking style, and framing and concluded that participants with 
high-rational/high-intuitive thinking styles and low-rational/low intuitive thinking styles 
demonstrated a significant framing effect (i.e., to select more sure choices for the gain frames 
compared to the loss frames) compared to those who were high-rational/low-intuitive or low-
rational /high-intuitive.     
Mahoney, Buboltz, Levin, Doverspike, and Svyantek (2011) examined the relationship 
among framing effects, gender, and risk-taking propensity. They used five variants of the Asian 
Disease Problem with different probabilities for the framing effects along with the Choice 
Dilemma Questionnaire (short-version of CDQ, Erker, 2000), the Risk Avoidance Scale (RAS, 
Shure & Meeker, 1967), the Stimulating Instrumental Risk Inventory (SIRI, Zaleskiewicz, 2001), 
and the REI (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). They found significant framing effects in a composite of 
11 
all five scenarios as well as at the individual scenario level (i.e., participants selected sure options 
on gain frames and risky/probabilistic options on loss frames for each of the cover stories). They 
found that 57.1% of participants manifested a “preference shift” – where across the five cover 
stories, there were more risky choices on loss frames than on gain frames. Complete “preference 
reversals” were more rare; only 9.2% chose the risky/probabilistic choice for all five loss frames 
and the sure choice for all five gain frames. As for individual differences, Mahoney et al. (2011) 
found that those classified as risk-averse on the CDQ measure showed a greater framing effect 
than the other risk groups; however, other risk style measures (RAS, SIRI and subscales of SIRI) 
did not show any interaction effect with frames. There were no significant framing effects 
involving rational or experiential thinking style on the REI. No gender difference was found for 
the framing effects.  
Thus, the current literature with adult (i.e., college-aged) samples has explored the 
relationship between framing effects and individual differences in various cognitive styles 
including rational-thinking, intuitive/holistic thinking, affective and cognitive perspective-taking 
and risk-aversion. From these studies, one can speculate that there may be some relationship 
between rational and intuitive thinking styles and framing effects, although the study by 
Mahoney et al. (2011) did not find the relationship with these thinking styles. The rational and 
experiential thinking styles were explored in the current study with adolescent samples. 
Although the adult decision-making literature provides a good foundation to understand the 
underlying mechanisms of cognitive biases, given the fact that adolescents make more risky 
decisions, in the subsequent section, I examine the developmental literature on framing effects to 
better understand the developmental trajectories of risky decision making. 
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Developmental Studies of the Framing Effects 
Although framing effects have been thoroughly explored in the adult decision-making 
literature, the number of developmental studies that examine this effect is limited. Reyna and 
Ellis (1994) examined framing effects in children ranging in age from 4 to 11 years. Unlike the 
original study by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) that used hypothetical scenarios, children were 
presented with an experimental task in which they could gain or lose prizes (i.e., brightly colored 
superballs). Reyna and Ellis presented the risky/probabilistic options with different levels of 
probability for losing balls or gaining balls. In order to simplify the presentation of probability, 
children were shown a spinner that corresponded to 1/2, 2/3, or 3/4 chance of winning or losing. 
In the gain frame, children were asked to choose between the risky/probabilistic option of 
winning more balls at various probabilities (1/2, 2/3, or 3/4) on a wooden spinner or the sure 
option of getting a certain numbers of balls. In the loss frame, children were asked to choose 
between a risky/probabilistic option of losing more balls at various probabilities (1/2, 2/3, or 3/4) 
or the sure option of losing a certain numbers of balls. The researchers found that pre-school 
aged children did not exhibit framing effects, as their pattern of performance was the same in the 
gain and loss frames (28% and 26% choosing the sure option, respectively). The second graders 
exhibited “reverse framing,” which was defined as a greater preference for risky/probabilistic 
choices in the gain frame than in the loss frame. The fifth grade children, in contrast, 
demonstrated standard framing effects by choosing the sure option in the gain frame, but the 
risky/probabilistic option in the loss frame.  
Chien, Lin, and Worthley (1996) examined framing effects with an adolescent sample 
(ninth and tenth graders) using the classic Asian Disease Problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) 
and additional similar scenarios that involved gaining or losing money instead saving or losing 
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human lives. Unlike Tversky and Kahneman’s study, they used a within-subject design asking all 
the participants to make decisions in both gain and loss frames. They found that the majority of 
adolescents (i.e., 71.6% for the Disease scenario and 56.5% for the Money scenario) selected the 
same response options both in the gain and loss frames; however, those who selected different 
options in the gain and loss frames exhibited the framing effect by choosing sure options in the 
gain frames and risky/probabilistic options in the loss frames. Additionally, Chien et al. 
examined individual differences such as gender and math placements (honor vs. regular), but did 
not find any significant differences in decision-making.  
Levin and Hart (2003) examined children’s (aged 5-7) risk-taking in loss and gain frames 
using a simplified version of the apparatus that Reyna and Ellis (1994) used. Children were 
asked to choose between risky/probabilistic gain of prizes (i.e., wrapped gift box with unknown 
content) and sure gain of prizes or between risky/probabilistic loss of prizes and sure loss of 
prizes, all resulting in equal expected value. They additionally collected data on measures of 
temperament including fearfulness, shyness, thrill seeking, impulsivity, and sadness in order to 
examine individual differences in the framing effect. Levin and Hart found that children chose 
more risky/probabilistic choices in the loss frame than in the gain frame but failed to demonstrate 
reversal of preference to sure options in the gain frame, which was found in the classic framing 
effect demonstrated in Tversky and Kahneman (1981). Shyness was negatively related to risk 
taking, whereas impulsivity was positively related to overall risk-taking choices. However, less 
sadness was related to more risk taking in the negative frame than in the positive frame. Levin 
and Hart stated that sadness in the children’s temperament scale is related to neuroticism scale in 
the Big Five Personality Inventory for adults, whereas shyness in the children’s temperament 
scale is inversely related to adult openness scale in the Big Five Personality Inventory. 
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Therefore, they concluded that the results from their study were consistent with adult literatures 
in individual difference in risk-taking, which demonstrated higher neuroticism and openness are 
related to more risk-taking behaviors.  
Schlottman and Tring (2005) examined framing effects on decision making in 6 to 10-
year-old children. They criticized Reyna and Ellis’s (1994) Spinner task for not having a salient 
contrast between the loss and gain frames and implemented a task where children helped a 
puppet decide which way of sharing jellybeans between a puppet and an experimenter was better 
for the puppet. The sure option was presented as the puppet gaining/losing an exact amount of 
jellybeans and the risky/probabilistic option was presented as puppet gaining/losing a 
probabilistic amount of jellybeans (e.g., .25 probability of winning all 16 or .75 probability of 
winning none). They found that children preferred the sure option more in the gain frame than in 
the loss frame, demonstrating that in this context, children displayed the same pattern of framing 
effects as adults.   
Reyna, Estrada, DeMarinis, Myers, Stanisz and Mills (2011) examined framing effects in 
samples of adolescents (aged 14 – 17) and young adults (aged 18 – 22) using the same spinner 
task as Reyna and Ellis (1994) but with three different levels of monetary rewards ($5, $20, and 
$150). They also collected data about the participants’ risky sexual behavior and intentions, and 
administered the Behavioral Activation Scale and Behavioral Inhibition Scale (BAS and BIS; 
Carver & White, 1994), the Sensation-Seeking Scale (Hoyle et al., 2002), and the Gist and 
Verbatim Scale (Mills et al., 2008). The Gist and Verbatim Scale includes questions for gist 
measures that were designed to draw on global attitudes and less mental presentations, and 
include questions for verbatim measures that were designed to elicit more specific or quantitative 
judgement (Reyna et al., p. 1129). They found that the adolescents and young adults exhibited 
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the standard framing effect (i.e., risk-taking in the loss frame and risk-aversion in the gain frame) 
for the majority of trials; however, on the trials where the rewards were large, adolescents 
demonstrated reversed framing (i.e., more risk-taking in the gain frame than in the loss-frame). 
Reyna and colleagues concluded that, as predicted by Fuzzy-trace theory, reverse framing was 
evidence of verbatim (i.e., analytical) processing. They also examined the relationship between 
framing effects and real-life risky sexual behaviors and concluded that age and verbatim 
responses were significant factors in predicting participants’ risky sexual behaviors. 
Additionally, they found that BIS and sensation-seeking scales were correlated with age, but did 
not predict directly the participants’ risky sexual behaviors.  
Thus to date, only a limited number of developmental studies on framing effects have 
been conducted, despite the fact that framing effects have been demonstrated in various risky 
decision-making situations in the adult literature. One problem with developmental studies of 
framing effects is that most of them adopted tasks that involved an element of gambling and 
gaming such as a spinner that shows various winning/losing odds (Levin & Hart, 2003, Reyna & 
Ellis, 1994; Reyna et al., 2011). Gambling and gaming tasks may not be the best method to study 
adolescent decision-making because these types of task inherently generate emotional arousal, 
which may have an impact on the results (Cheung & Mikels, 2011). Additionally, these 
experimental tasks lack ecological validity, that is, they do not approximate real-life risk-taking 
settings, which may become a threat to external validity as well (Reyna et al., 2011). Another 
consideration of gambling tasks is that children are not familiar with the gambling tasks because 
organized gambling is typically illegal for children under 18. The results from gambling or 
gaming tasks have to be critically analyzed in terms of these validities.  
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Moreover, developmental research on framing effects has just begun to examine 
individual differences in decision making. Unlike the adult literature, which has studied wide 
spectrum of individual differences such as rational and experiential thinking style preference 
(LeBoeuf & Shafir, 2003; McElroy & Seta, 2003; Shiloh, Salton & Shrabi, 2002), and working 
memory capacity (Corbin, McElroy & Black, 2010) and non-cognitive domains such as self-
esteem (McElroy, Seta & Waring, 2007) and personality (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber & Lauriola, 
2002), only a few developmental studies (Chien, Lin & Worthley, 1996; Levin & Hart, 2003; 
Reyna et al., 2011) have examined individual differences in relation to the framing effects.  
Thus, the number of developmental research studies on the framing effect is limited and 
additional studies are needed in order to better understand the developmental path of cognitive 
biases, especially during adolescence, and in non-gaming or non-gambling contexts. Current 
dual-process theories (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Evans, 2003, Kahneman, 2011), which are used 
to explain the framing effect and other cognitive heuristics in the adult literature, are largely 
silent with respect to predictions about the development of analytic and experiential processing. 
Fuzzy-trace theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995) is a theoretical framework that has been used to 
explain developmental differences in the framing effect. In the developmental view of fuzzy-
trace theory, children are less influenced by framing effects compared to adults, because children 
tend to use verbatim-based (i.e., analytical) processing. As development progresses, adolescents 
use more gist-based (i.e., experiential) processing and become susceptible to framing effects. 
Additionally, individual difference measures were analyzed in order to examine adolescents’ 
susceptibility to framing effects. 
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Present Study 
As discussed earlier, many researchers have studied the development of risk-taking 
behaviors through analyses of actual risk-taking rates. Although it is important to fully 
understand their current behaviors and their relationship with potential contributing factors of the 
behaviors, it is also important to understand the processes of decision-making that leads to these 
risky behaviors. Therefore, the present study examined one aspect of adolescent decision-making 
processes by analyzing framing effects (i.e., choices presented in terms of gains tend to elicit 
risk-averse behaviors, whereas choices presented in terms of losses tend to elicit risk-taking 
behaviors) using adolescent-relevant scenarios. The present study examined whether or not 
younger (aged 14-15) and older (aged 16-18) adolescents were susceptible to framing effects like 
adults, but specifically in the context of the types of “risky” decisions that adolescents are likely 
to face. Additionally, the present study addressed several important issues that had been 
identified from the literature review. The present study addressed the issue of task-relevance by 
using the original framing effect task (i.e., the Asian Disease Problem) and contrasting 
performance on this version with ecologically valid and adolescent-relevant cover stories that are 
applicable to the real-world experiences of adolescents. It also addressed the issue of individual 
differences by relating framing effects to various individual measures including personality, 
impulsivity, and thinking style preferences (i.e., rational vs. experiential). 
Hypotheses and Research Questions 
Hypotheses 
1. Developmental Patterns in the Standard Framing Effects Task. Although the Asian Disease 
Problem is used frequently to assess susceptibility of framing effects in adult samples, there are a 
limited number of adolescent studies that use the Asian Disease Problem. Most other studies 
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with children use gaming/gambling tasks. The present study explored the susceptibility to 
framing effects using the classic Asian Disease Problem with adolescent and college age 
samples. I hypothesized that the standard pattern of framing effects (i.e., more likely to select 
sure options in gain frames and selecting risky/probabilistic options in loss frames) would be 
more likely among the college-aged groups compared to the high school groups when they were 
presented with original Asian Disease Problem. 
2. Developmental Patterns for Different Scenarios. The developmental literature on cognitive 
biases demonstrates that adolescents tend to use more experiential processing in social contexts 
and are prone to a variety of other cognitive biases (Albert & Steinberg, 2011; Klaczynski, 
2002). Thus, I hypothesized that 12th graders would be most likely to choose the 
risky/probabilistic options when presented with adolescent-relevant scenarios compared to the 
classic Asian Disease Problem, relative to the other three age groups.   
Exploratory Research Questions: Individual Differences in Susceptibility to Framing Effects 
1. Thinking Style. Previous research with adults investigated experiential/holistic thinking and 
rational/analytical styles as potential individual difference moderators of framing effects 
(Mahoney et al., 2011; McElroy & Seta, 2003; Shiloh et al., 2002) and yielded mixed results. No 
developmental literature with adolescents has explored thinking styles as potential moderators. 
Additionally, dual process theory and fuzzy-trace theory have not demonstrated a clear 
developmental path through adolescence on the potential effects of thinking styles on framing 
effects. Therefore, my first exploratory question is whether or not (a) experiential thinking style 
would moderate susceptibility to framing effects; and (b) rational thinking style would moderate 
susceptibility to framing effects. 
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2. Personality. Levin and Harts (2003) explored children’s temperament and found that shyness 
in children’s temperament scale moderates the occurrence of framing effects, whereas sadness in 
children’s temperament scale moderates overall risk-taking in the framing tasks. Thus far, no 
studies have been conducted with adolescents to explore the influence of personality on the 
tendency to be susceptible to framing effects. As mentioned in Levin and Harts (2003), 
fearfulness in the children’s temperament scale is related to neuroticism scale in the Big Five 
Personality Inventory for adults (Rusting, 1998), whereas shyness in the children’s temperament 
scale is inversely related to adult openness scale in the Big Five Personality Inventory (Levin et 
al., 2002). Therefore, my second exploratory question was whether or not (a) openness to 
experience would moderate susceptibility to framing effects; and (b) neuroticism would 
moderate susceptibility to framing effects. 
3. Impulsivity. Impulsivity is a personal trait that has been cited as a predictor of various risk-
taking behaviors among adolescents including risky sexual behaviors (Dir, Coskunpinar, & 
Cyders, 2014 for review) and substance use (Collado, Felton, MacPherson, & Lejuez, 2014; 
Dick, Smith, Olausson, Mitchell, Leeman, O'Malley, & Sher, 2010; Elkins, King, McGue, & 
Iacono, 2006). Therefore, my third exploratory question was whether or not (a) functional 
impulsivity would moderate susceptibility to framing effects; and (b) dysfunctional impulsivity 
would moderate susceptibility to framing effects. 
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CHAPTER III: METHOD 
Participants 
There were four groups of participants: (a) 52 ninth-graders between 14-16 (mean age = 
14.54, SD = .07, percentage female = 51.92%), (b) 29 twelfth-graders between 17-18 (mean age 
= 17.62, SD = .115, percentage female = 51.72%) in high school, (c) 31 younger emerging adults 
between 18-19 (mean age = 18.77, SD = .076, percentage female = 87.10%), and (d) 38 older 
emerging adults between 20-24 (mean age = 20.88, SD = .19, percentage female = 78.95%).  
Based on a power analysis using G*Power for a repeated measures design and effect 
sizes found in the framing effects literature, the target number of participants was between 25 to 
33 participants in each age group. For the purposes of some of the analyses involving individual 
difference variables, however, participants were combined into two age groups: high school 
students (i.e., ninth and twelfth graders) and college students (i.e., younger emerging adults and 
older emerging adults). 
Procedure 
High School participants were recruited from local high schools, and college students 
were recruited using the SONA system for psychological research at Illinois State University. 
Prior to the study, I contacted school boards, school districts, principals, and teachers in order to 
obtain necessary approvals to conduct a study at schools. A parental consent form was sent via 
students to all parents at the high schools where administrators agreed to allow students to 
participate. Only the students with signed parental consent forms were allowed to participate in 
the study. Students under 18 who volunteered to participate also completed an informed assent 
document. Students who had reached the age of 18 signed their own informed consent document. 
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Participants then completed a paper-and-pencil booklet including experimental scenarios 
and individual difference measures of thinking styles, impulsivity, and personality. At the 
conclusion of the data collection, participants were asked to complete demographic survey (e.g., 
gender and race) and read a debriefing statement that included appropriate contact information 
for questions about the study and their rights as a participant.  
The participants were tested in groups. For participants in high school, they were tested in 
their classrooms as part of the health or English classes. The students who were not participating 
in the study or finished the experimental tasks earlier than other students were given another task 
(e.g., reading a brochure about healthy eating). College students were tested in small classrooms. 
High school participants were eligible to enter a raffle to win one of two $25 
Amazon.com gift cards. Interested participants gave their email address on separate piece of 
paper for drawing. The raffle information was not entered in the database and there was no 
attempt to match participant email addresses with other data collected in the study. College 
students received extra credit for their classes via the SONA system. 
Materials 
The Asian Disease Problem  
The Asian Disease Problem is a classic paradigm used to demonstrate the framing effect 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Participants read a hypothetical scenario where a new disease 
would be expected to kill 600 people and are asked to choose between “certain” and “risky” 
programs to combat the disease. The Asian Disease Problem consists of two options that are 
presented in two different “frames” (Figure 1).  
 A “gain frame” (Problem 1 in Figure 1) was presented in terms of lives saved 
whereas a “loss frame” (Problem 2 in Figure 1) was presented in terms of lives lost. For each 
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frame, there were two programs that participants can choose from. A “sure” or non-probabilistic 
option was written in a way that exact number of people would be either killed or saved (e.g., 
400 people will be saved). A “risky” or probabilistic option was written in a way that certain 
percentage of people would be either killed or saved (e.g., 2/3 of people will be killed). The 
probabilities of lives saved or lost in the “sure” or the “risky/probabilistic” program were 
identical.   
Modified Adolescent-Relevant Problem Scenarios   
Previous research with adult sample has demonstrated the framing effects where choices 
involving gains (as in the gain frame) are often risk-averse in that people choose the certain 
option, whereas choices involving losses are often risk-taking in that people choose the risky 
option in a variety of modified scenarios (e.g., Gambling, Tax evasion, Bargaining, Message 
compliance, Clinical Reasoning, and Evaluation of objects; see Kühberger, 1998, for review). In 
addition to the classic Asian Disease scenario described above, this study provided several 
additional scenarios that were modified to examine decision making behaviors in potential risky 
situations of adolescents’ lives (see Appendix C). Topics for modified scenarios included 
sexually transmitted infections, underage drinking, and illegal drug use. The format of the 
problems follows that used by Mahoney et al. (2010). The probabilities and payoffs in the 
problems were varied in the range specified by summary studies of framed risky choice 
(Kühberger, 1998, 1999). In his meta-analysis, Kühberger (1989, 1999) recommended the 
probabilities in the risky option to range from one-third to one-half and the payoffs to range from 
60 to 10,000 people or objects. Because this recommended payoff range is quite large, my 
materials included scenarios that ranged from 400 to 4,000 people being affected (see Appendix 
C). In addition to addressing these concerns about probabilities and payoff range from the 
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existing framing literature, varying these problem characteristics made the study more interesting 
for participants and to prevent potential fatigue in answering multiple questions about similar 
scenarios (Mahoney et al., 2010).  
Rational-Experiential Inventory - Adolescents (REI-A) 
A modified version of Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj 
& Heier, 1995) for adolescents by Marks, Hine, Blore and Phillips (2008) includes 20 items to 
assess preferences for processing information. It consists of two subscales, rational thinking and 
experiential thinking. Rationality thinking, measured by an adapted Need for Cognition Scale 
(NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), emphasizes a conscious and analytical approach whereas 
experiential thinking, measured by the Faith in Intuition (FI) scale, emphasizes pre-conscious, 
affective, and holistic approaches. The modified version (REI-A) has good international 
consistency for both thinking styles (rational α=0.89; experiential α= 0.81; Marks et al., 2008). In 
the current study, the reliability for the rational subscale was .86 and the reliability for the 
experiential scale was .79. 
Dickman Impulsivity Inventory (DII) 
The Dickman Impulsivity Inventory (DII; Dickman, 1990) is a 23-item self-report 
questionnaire developed to measure two types of impulsivity: Functional and Dysfunctional 
Impulsivity. Eleven items are designed to measure Functional Impulsivity and another 12 items 
to measure Dysfunctional Impulsivity. Functional Impulsivity is the tendency to act with 
relatively little forethought when such a style is optimal, whereas Dysfunctional Impulsivity is 
defined as the tendency to act with less forethought than most people of equal ability. Fino et al. 
(2014) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .81 for Dysfunctional Impulsivity and .78 for Functional 
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Impulsivity. In the current sample, the reliability was .77 for Dysfunctional and .68 for 
Functional impulsivity. 
Mini-International Personality Item Pool (Mini-IPIP) 
The Mini-IPIP (Donnellan, Oswald, Baird, & Lucas, 2006) is an abbreviated version of 
the Five-Factor Personality Inventory, and consists of 20 items measuring extraversion, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, openness to experience, and neuroticism. It has 
an acceptable internal consistency (i.e., Conscientiousness, α=.65; Extraversion, α =.71; 
Agreeableness, α=.70; Openness to experience, α=.65; Neuroticism, α=.62). Only the subscales 
for Openness (α= .67) and Neuroticism (α= .65) were used in the current research.  
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 
Each participant was given a score of 1 for choosing the risky/probabilistic choice, and 0 
for choosing the sure choice for each of the eight problems in Appendix A. As there are 4 gain 
frames and 4 loss frames, two composites were tallied, with possible scores of 0-4 for gain 
frames, and 0-4 for loss frames, where a larger score is considered to reflect more risk-taking.  
Framing Effects and Risky Choices 
Framing effects have historically been defined as either preference shifts or reversals at 
the group level (Kuhberger, 1991). Following the method employed by Mahoney et al. (2011), I 
counted the frequency of (a) “preference reversals” (i.e., where participants select the sure option 
in every gain frame and choose the risky/probabilistic option in every loss frame), (b) 
“preference shifts” (i.e., more risky/probabilistic choices in loss frames than in the gain frames at 
composite level) and (c) “lenient interpretation of preference reversals” (i.e., where participants 
selected the sure options in most of the gain frames (i.e., 3 or 4 out of 4) and also choose the 
risky options in the most of the loss frames (i.e., 3 or 4 out of 4).   
None of the participants in any of the four age groups demonstrated complete preference 
reversals. Table 1 presents percentage of preference shifts and lenient interpretation of 
preference reversals by age group. Chi-square tests were conducted in order to examine whether 
the proportion of participants showing preference shifts and lenient preference reversals was 
different for the age groups. There was no significant group difference for preference shifts, χ2 
(3, N = 154) = 6.171, p = .104, whereas there was significant group difference for lenient 
preference reversals, χ2 (3, N = 154) = 8.013, p = .046. Younger emerging adults demonstrated 
the highest percentage of lenient preference reversals (67.7%) followed by older emerging adults 
(42.5%), 9th graders (39.6%), and 12th graders (36.7%).  
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As a preliminary analysis, I looked at the number of risky choices as a function of Age 
Group and Frame. A 2 (Frame: gain vs. loss) x 4 (Age: 9th grade, 12th grade, younger emerging 
adults, and older emerging adults) mixed Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted with 
the number of risky choices as the dependent variable. Frame was a repeated-measures factor 
and Age was a between-subjects factor. There was main effect of Frame, F(1, 150) = 46.35, p < 
.01, ηp2 = .236, a main effect of Age, F(3, 150) = 267, p = .048, ηp2 = .051, and a significant 
interaction of Frame and Age, F(3, 150) = 3.349, p = .021, ηp2 = .063. An analysis of the simple 
effects revealed that for the 12th graders, the effect of Frame was not significant, F(1, 150) = 
1.356, p = .246, ηp2 = .009, because they were making more risky choices in both frames 
compared to other groups (see Figure 2). The effect of Frame was significant (and consistent 
with the classic framing effect) for the other three groups (all ps < .001). 
Tests of Hypotheses and Exploratory Research Questions 
Hypothesis one stated that the standard pattern of framing effects (i.e., more likely to 
select sure options in gain frames and selecting risky/probabilistic options in loss frames) would 
be more likely among the college-aged groups compared to high school student groups when 
they were presented with the original Asian Disease Problem. A 2 (framing effect: yes/no) x 4 
(Age groups: 9th grade, 12th grade, younger emerging adults and older emerging adults) Chi-
square test of association indicated that the proportion of participants showing the framing effect 
in each age group was significantly different, χ2 (3, N = 154) = 13.907, p = .003. Among the 
college-aged groups, 54.8% of younger emerging adults and 35.0% of older emerging adults 
showed the framing effect on the Asian Disease Problem, whereas only 24.5% of 9th graders and 
13.3% of 12th graders showed the framing effect (see Figure 3). Thus, hypothesis one was 
supported.  
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Hypothesis two stated that 12th graders would be most likely to choose the 
risky/probabilistic options when presented with adolescent-relevant scenarios compared to the 
classic Asian Disease Problem, relative to other three groups. For this analysis, I computed the 
percentage of risky choices on the two versions of the Asian Disease problem and on the six 
adolescent-relevant scenarios in order to compare across the two problem types. A 2 (Problem 
Type: adolescent-relevant vs. Asian Disease) x 4 (Age: 9th grade, 12th grade, younger emerging 
adults, and older emerging adults) mixed Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted with 
the percentage of risky choices as the dependent variable. Problem type was a repeated-measures 
factor and Age was a between-subjects factor. There was no main effect of Problem Type, F(1, 
150) = 9.66, p = .327, ηp2 = .006, no main effect of Age, F(3, 150) = 2.058, p = .108, ηp2 = .040, 
nor a significant interaction of Problem Type and Age, F(3, 150) = 1.438, p = .234, ηp2 = .028. 
Thus, hypothesis two was not supported.   
Exploratory questions investigated the influence of thinking styles, personality, and 
impulsivity on framing effects. Following Mahoney et al. (2011), thinking style, personality, and 
impulsivity scores were trichotomized (low, middle, and high). Prior to this, I tested whether the 
age groups had similar distributions of scores. For thinking styles, there was a significance age 
group difference for experiential thinking scores, F(3, 150) = 3.602, p = .015. Although there 
was only a marginal age group difference for rational thinking scores, F(3, 150) = 2.158, p = 
.095, the distribution appeared to be different for each group; thus, each age group was 
trichomotmized separately. Table 2 shows the range of scores for low, middle, and high for each 
group for rational and experiential Thinking scores. For personality, the neuroticism subscale 
demonstrated a significant difference in distribution of scores among age groups, F(3, 150) = 
2.694, p = .048; therefore, it was trichomomized separately by age groups. Table 3 shows range 
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of scores for low, middle, and high for each group. Because the openness to experience subscale, 
and the dysfunctional and functional subscales of the Dickman Impulsivity Scale did not indicate 
age differences (all ps > .05), all participants were trichotomized using the same criteria 
regardless of age (see Table 4).  
Additionally, for subsequent analyses of individual differences, I combined participants 
into two age groups (i.e., college vs. high school) because analyzing four groups of 
trichotomized individual difference variables would not have adequate power to detect any 
moderation of individual difference variables on framing effects. 
Exploratory research question 1A examined whether or not experiential thinking style 
would moderate participants’ susceptibility to framing effects. A mixed ANOVA was performed 
using the score on the experiential subscale of the REI (low, mid, high) and Age (high school vs. 
college students) as between-subject variables, and Frame (gain or loss) as a repeated measures 
factor. The number of risky/probabilistic choices (range 0-4) was the dependent variable. As 
shown in Table 5, there was an expected significant main effect of Frame, F(1, 148) = 46.726, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .24, and expected significant interaction between Frame and Age, F(1, 148) = 
4.085, p = .045, ηp2= .03. However, there was no significant interaction effect of Frame, Age, 
and Experiential Thinking scores, F(2, 148) = 0.002, p = .998. For between-subjects effects, 
there was no significant main effect of Age, F(1, 148) = 0.035, p =.852, and no main effect of 
Experiential Thinking, F(2, 148) = .537, p =.585; however, there was a significant interaction 
between Age and Experiential Thinking, F(2, 148) = 3.325, p =.039, ηp2 = .04. Figure 4 
illustrates the full design and demonstrates that college students with high experiential scores 
showed most pronounced pattern of framing effects (i.e., as represented by a large difference in 
the number of risky choices between the gain and loss frames). Additionally, Figure 5 illustrates 
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the interaction between experiential thinking style and age on risky choices. In terms of 
experiential thinking score, the difference between the number of risky choices (regardless of 
Frame) for high school and college students was only significant for those with low experiential 
thinking, F(1,148) = 3.76, p = .05, ηp2= .025. There were no significant differences in risky 
choices between high school and college students with moderate or high experiential thinking 
styles (ps > .15). 
Exploratory research question 1B investigated whether or not rational thinking style 
would moderate participants’ susceptibility to framing effects. A mixed ANOVA was performed 
using the score the Rational subscale of the REI (low, middle, and high) and Age (high school 
vs. college) as between-subject variables, and Frame (gain vs. loss) as a repeated-measures 
factor. The number of risky/probabilistic choices (range 0-4) was the dependent variable (Table 
6). As expected, there was a significant main effect of Frame, F(1, 148) = 58.61, p < .001, and a 
significant interaction of Frame and Age, F(1, 148) = 5.43, p = .03. However, there was no 
significant main effect of Age, F(1, 148) = .12, p = .73, no significant main effect of Rational 
Thinking F(2, 148) = 1.192, p = .31, and no interaction between Age and Rational Thinking, F(2, 
148) = 1.36, p = .27. Interestingly, there was a significant interaction of Frame, Age, and 
Rational Thinking, F(2, 148) = 7.47, p = .001. Although data shows framing effects for high 
school students in the low rational thinking group (as indicated by the difference between risky 
choices in the gain and loss frames), the college students with moderate and high rational 
thinking score were most susceptible to the framing effect (see Figure 6).  
Exploratory research question two investigated the influence of personality on framing 
effects. For exploratory research question 2A, whether or not openness to experience in the Big 
Five Personality Inventory would moderate susceptibility to framing effects in adolescents and 
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emerging adults, a mixed ANOVA was performed using the score on the Openness to 
Experience subscale of the Mini-IPIP (i.e., low, mid, or high) and Age (High School or College) 
as between-subject variables, and Frame (gain or loss) as a repeated measures factor, with the 
number of risky choices (range 0-4) as the dependent variable. As expected based on earlier 
analyses, there was a main effect of Frame, F(1, 148) = 49.219, p < .001, and interaction effect 
between Frame and Age groups, F(1, 148) = 5.217, p = .024. However, there was no significant 
interaction effect between Frame and Openness to Experience score, F(2, 148) = 2.293, p = .105, 
between Age and Openness to Experience score, F(2, 148) = 2.809, p = .063, or among Frame, 
Age, and Openness to Experiences score, F(2, 148) = 1.290, p = .278. Thus, openness to 
experience did not moderate susceptibility to framing effects.  
For exploratory research question 2B, whether or not neuroticism would moderate 
susceptibility to framing effects, a mixed ANOVA was performed using the score on the 
Neuroticism subscale (low, mid, and high) and Age (High School or College) as between-subject 
variables, and Frame (gain or loss) as a repeated measures factor, with the number of risky 
choices (range 0-4) as the dependent variable. As expected, there was a main effect of Frame, 
F(1, 148) = 46.998, p < .001, and an interaction between Frame and Age, F(1, 148) = 3.865, p = 
.051; however, there was no significant interaction between Frame and Neuroticism score, F(2, 
148) = 0.005, p = .995, between Neuroticism and Age, F(2,148) = 1.065, p = .347, or among 
Frame, Age, and Neuroticism, F(2, 148) = 0.177, p = .838. Thus, neuroticism did not moderate 
susceptibility to framing effects. 
Exploratory research question three investigated the influence of impulsivity on framing 
effects. For exploratory research question 3A, whether or not functional impulsivity would 
moderate susceptibility to framing effects, a mixed ANOVA was performed using the score on 
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the Functional subscale (low, mid, high) and Age groups (high school vs. college students) as 
between-subject variables, and Frame (gain or loss) as a repeated measures factor, with the 
number of risky choices (range 0-4) as the dependent variable. As expected, there was significant 
main effect of Frame, F(1, 148) = 51.404, p <.001, and significant interaction effect between 
Frame and Age, F(1, 148) = 6.241, p = .014. There was no significant interaction between Frame 
and Functional Impulsivity score, F(2, 148) = 1.001, p = .370, between Functional Impulsivity 
and Age, F(2, 148) = 1.767, p = .174, or among Frame, Age, and Functional Impulsivity score, 
F(2, 148) = 1.359, p = .260. Thus, functional impulsivity did not moderate susceptibility to 
framing effects. 
For exploratory research question 3B, whether or not dysfunctional impulsivity would 
moderate susceptibility to the framing effects, a mixed ANOVA was performed using the score 
on the Dysfunctional subscale (low, mid, high) and Age groups (High School or College 
Students) as between-subject variables, and Frame (gain or loss) as a repeated measures factor, 
with the number of risky choices (range 0-4) as the dependent variable. There was the expected 
main effect of Frame, F(1, 148) = 45.867, p < .001. However, there were no significant 
interaction between Frame and Age groups, F(1, 148) = 3.315, p = .071, between Frame and 
Dysfunctional Impulsivity Score, F(2, 148) = 0.275, p = .760, between Dysfunctional 
Impulsivity Score and Age F(2, 148) = 0.125, p = .862. Additionally, there was no significant 
three-way interaction effect of Frame, Age, and Dysfunctional Impulsivity score, F(2, 148) = 
1.894, p = .154. Thus, dysfunctional impulsivity did not moderate susceptibility to framing 
effects. 
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CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION 
Although framing effects have been extensively studied within the adult population (i.e., 
college-aged participants), developmental studies of framing effects are limited. Fuzzy-trace 
theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995) is one of the few theories that aims to explain developmental 
differences in framing effects. The theory posits that children are less influenced by framing 
effects compared to adults, because children tend to use verbatim-based (i.e., analytical) 
processing, and as development progresses, adolescents use more gist-based (i.e., experiential) 
processing and thus become susceptible to framing effects. The present study, however, 
demonstrated that adolescents were less susceptible to framing effects compared with adults 
when the classic Asian Disease scenario was used. The original Asian Disease task was also used 
with an adolescent sample in the study by Chien, Lin, and Worthley (1996). Their study 
concluded that adolescents were susceptible to framing effects. In a closer look at their study, 
however, 71.6% of adolescents (66 out of 92 adolescents) selected the same option regardless of 
gain or loss frames. The present study showed a pattern similar to Chien et al.’s study such that 
73% of high school students (61 out of 83 adolescents) selected the same option regardless of 
gain or loss frames. In Chien et al.’s study, of adolescents who choose different options for gain 
and loss frames, 73% displayed the classic framing effect. In the present study, 77% of 
adolescents who choose different options for gain and loss frames displayed the framing effect. 
Thus, the present study demonstrated the same developmental pattern as Chien et al.’s study. 
Because the overwhelming majority of adolescents chose the same options in both frames, the 
results of these studies do not support the claim made by the Fuzzy-trace theory that posits 
adolescents become susceptible to framing effects. The finding that adolescents are not 
necessarily affected by framing effects, aligns with findings that adolescents overall have a 
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tendency to engage in risk-taking behaviors (Kann et al., 2014). So, regardless of framing 
condition, they are more likely to choose the risky choice.   
The present study also investigated whether or not adolescent-relevant scenarios would 
influence risky decision-making. The results showed that there was no significant difference in 
risky decision-making between the classic Asian Disease Scenarios and the adolescent-relevant 
scenarios. Although previous research shows that adolescents tend to use more experiential 
processing in social contexts and are prone to a variety of other cognitive biases (e.g., Albert & 
Steinberg, 2011; Klaczynski, 2002), adolescents and emerging adults in the present study did not 
seem to be influenced by the scenarios that resembled their social context.  
Additionally, the present study investigated the influence of individual differences on 
framing effects with adolescent and college-aged samples. The study examined the effect of 
thinking styles (i.e., experiential thinking and rational thinking styles), personality dimensions 
(i.e., openness to new experience and neuroticism), and impulsivity (i.e., functional and 
dysfunctional impulsivity). As for experiential thinking, the results showed that college students 
with high experiential scores demonstrated the most pronounced pattern of framing effects. In 
the normative view of rational decision-making (Albert & Stenberg, 2011), cognitive biases 
occur due to experiential thinking processes that are not overridden by analytical thinking 
processes (Evans, 2003; Klaczynski, 2005; Stanovich, 1999). Thus, the current study confirms 
this view of rational decision making because college students who are high in experiential 
thinking failed to override their intuition.  
 As for rational thinking style, a three-way interaction between Age, Frame, and Rational 
Thinking was found. College students with moderate and high rational thinking scores were most 
susceptible to framing effects. Moreover, high school students in the low rational thinking group 
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were more susceptible to framing effects. This is a very interesting developmental change in that 
rational thinking style moderated the susceptibility of the framing effect in an opposite way 
between high school and college students. Previous studies of rational and experiential thinking 
styles with adult sample have not found consistent results and none of the developmental studies 
have looked at rational-experiential thinking styles as moderators (Mahoney et al., 2011; Shiloh 
et al., 2002). Thus, the present study demonstrated an interesting developmental path for how 
rational thinking style might influence the susceptibility of individuals to framing effects. High 
school students with low rational thinking scores failed to override their intuitive thinking. This 
finding also confirms the normative view of rational thinking (Albert & Stenberg, 2011) 
discussed for college students with high experiential thinking. However, the same explanation 
does not apply to the college students, because moderate- and high-rational thinkers failed to 
override their intuitive thinking. I speculate that college students with moderate-to-high rational 
thinking scores may also be high in experiential thinking. Shiloh, Salton, and Sharabi (2002) 
found that participants with the combination of high rational and high experiential scores and 
those with the combination of low rational and low experiential scores were most susceptible to 
the framing effect. Therefore, if college students with high experiential thinking scores were also 
high in rational thinking, the present finding of their high susceptibility to framing effects would 
replicate the finding from Shiloh et al. (2002). Unfortunately, this speculation cannot be tested in 
the present study because dividing the participants into four categories (i.e., high-experiential-
high-rational, low-experiential-high-rational, high-experiential-low rational, and low-
experiential-low-rational) would result in having too small number of participants in each 
category to yield significant power for the analysis.  
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The present study also investigated other individual difference measures including 
functional and dysfunctional impulsivity, and the neuroticism and openness to exploration 
subscales of Big Five Personality inventory. The results showed that none of these measures 
affected the susceptibility to framing effects in significant ways. As for personality measures, 
Levin and Hart (2003) examined moderation of the framing effect using children’s temperament 
scores (which is related to Big Five personality traits in adults) and found that more sadness 
(which is related to neuroticism in Big Five personality traits) and less shyness (which is 
inversely related to openness to experience in Big Five personality traits) were related to more 
risk-taking behaviors in both the gain and loss frames. They also found that less sadness was 
related to framing effects (i.e., there was more risk-taking in the loss frame relative to the gain 
frame for those who were low in sadness). The present study, however, did not find any 
significant moderation of these personality measures on framing effects. In the present study, 
openness to experience and neuroticism did not influence susceptibility to framing effects for 
either the high school or college students. I speculate that individuals who were high in 
neuroticism in the present study may not have been affected by similar emotional arousal that 
children in Levin and Hart’s experiment may have experienced. The present study used Asian 
Disease scenarios, whereas Levin and Hart’s study used a spinner task. As discussed earlier, 
gambling and gaming tasks inherently generate emotional arousal (Cheung & Mikels, 2011), 
which may have an impact on their results, especially those with more sadness (i.e., equivalent to 
adult neuroticism). Moreover, although adolescent research often cites impulsivity for a predictor 
of various risk-taking behaviors (e.g., Robbins & Bryan, 2004; Romer, 2010; Steinberg, 2008), 
impulsivity – whether functional or dysfunctional -- did not influence the susceptibility to 
framing effects in the present study. I speculate that impulsivity may not have impacted 
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participants in this experimental task because the task is aimed to test reasoning in risky 
situations instead of actual behaviors in risky situations.  
Strengths and Limitations 
The present study examined the developmental course of framing effects using the classic 
Asian Disease task. As discussed earlier in my literature review, most of the developmental 
research on framing effects used gambling or spinner tasks. The present study was one of the few 
studies to examine framing effects with adolescents using the original task used by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981). Using the same task with adults minimized the effect of emotional arousal 
typically found in gambling and spinner tasks, and made it more comparable to the results of the 
present study with extensive studies of framing effects with adult population. 
The present study also examined framing effects and risky decision-making in various 
new ways. This study was the first developmental study that used modified scenarios that were 
relevant to adolescent lives, and these modified scenarios appear to be a good alternative to the 
classic Asian Disease scenario because adolescent-relevant scenarios did not yield significantly 
different results in framing effects from the Asian Disease scenario. Although Kühberger (1998) 
suggested that the Asian Disease cover story as the best cover story because it yields the biggest 
effect size, I posit that adolescent-relevant scenarios can be used in the future study to examine 
adolescent decision-making tendencies because these scenarios may provide more realistic 
choices in adolescents’ lives. 
 In spite of its strengths, the current study had limitations that might have affected the 
results of the study. First, as already noted, the sample size was smaller than originally targeted 
and could not yield sufficient power for some of the analyses in the study, especially in the 
analysis of the effects of individual difference variables (i.e., thinking style, personality, 
37 
impulsivity) on framing effects for my exploratory research questions. If my sample sizes were 
larger, I may have been able to examine the four age groups separately and had adequate power 
to determine if some of these individual difference variables, for example, influenced the 9th and 
12th graders differently. 
The present study employed a within-subjects design and revealed interesting information 
that is not available in the between-subject design. The result showed that a notable number of 
adolescents (73% of high school students) were not influenced by the gain or loss frames, thus 
they selected the same type of response option for both frames. Although the within-subject 
design revealed this interesting finding, it also created some limitations to the study. The 
experimental booklet had a series of framing effects questions one after another and high school 
students may not have paid sufficient attention to each scenario and question. Although I 
replicated the experimental procedure used by Mahoney et al. (2011), the results may have been 
different if framing effects tasks were spread out across the experimental booklets. 
Directions for Future Research 
For future research, more studies of the framing effect with adolescent samples are 
needed in order to demonstrate clearer developmental path of cognitive biases in risky decision-
making. Thus far, Chien, Lin, and Worthley (1996) is the only other study that has used the 
classic Asian Disease scenario with adolescent samples, and their study yielded similar results to 
those in the present study in that the majority of adolescent participants selected risky choices 
regardless of the gain and loss frames. Although the use of a within-subjects design helped both 
studies to examine risky decision-making across both gain and loss frames, and across various 
scenarios, another close analysis of framing effects with a more typical between-subjects design 
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(but that requires a much larger sample size) that minimizes potential fatigue effects could 
increase our understanding of developmental path of framing effects. 
Additionally, I recommend inclusion of some of the design features illustrated in the 
present study: use of adolescent-relevant scenarios and use of various other individual difference 
measures to determine the extent to which the individual differences would affect the 
developmental path of risky decision-making. Although the present study did not find 
statistically significant difference between the classic Asian Disease scenarios and adolescents-
relevant scenarios, adolescent-relevant scenarios would still increase ecological validity of the 
study that involves adolescents because these scenarios are based on the situations where 
adolescents are familiar with and make daily decisions. Moreover, the present study 
demonstrated rational thinking styles as a significant moderator in framing effects; thus, future 
research may want to examine other dimensions of individual measures that are often cited in the 
adolescent literature such as sensation seeking behaviors (Arnett, 1994; Steinberg, 2008; Albert 
& Steinberg, 2011) and risk-taking propensity (Lejuez, Aklin, Bornovalova, & Moolchan, 2005). 
Conclusion 
The present study found that adolescents (i.e., high school students) were less susceptible 
to framing effects compared to the college-age students on the classic Asian Disease problem 
and its modified scenarios. Unlike other developmental studies, which used spinner or gambling 
tasks, using the same task with adult studies resulted in ability to make comparison with adult 
literature. The strongest framing effects were found among the younger emerging adult college 
students, which is the population that has been studied most extensively. 
Developmental literature on the framing effect is scarce; however, the review of literature 
in Chapter 2 and the findings from the present study revealed a very interesting developmental 
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path. Over the course of child to adult development, the following developmental patterns have 
been observed.  Pre-school aged children did not exhibit framing effects, second graders 
exhibited “reverse framing” (i.e., a greater preference for risky/probabilistic choices in the gain 
frame than in the loss frame), and fifth graders demonstrated the standard framing effect (Reyna 
& Ellis, 1994). The high school students chose the same risky options regardless of frames, 
although those who did not choose the same option demonstrated framing effects (Chien et al., 
1996 and present study). Younger college students demonstrated the most pronounced framing 
effects, whereas the older college students showed less framing effects compared with the 
younger college students. Although more studies are needed to have a solid understanding of this 
subject, it is interesting that younger college students who are likely to be subjects of “adult” 
studies in many psychological studies tend to show most pronounced framing effects. Close 
analyses of “adult” studies that separate subjects by age may be necessarily to understand why 
younger college students have the most pronounced framing effects. 
The present study also found that rational thinking style moderated the susceptibility to 
framing effects for high school and college students. I found that college students with moderate 
and high rational thinking score were most susceptible to the framing effect, whereas high school 
students with low rational thinking score were more susceptible to framing effect compared to 
those with moderate and high rational thinking scores. This finding has important practical 
implications for practitioners working with high school and college students. Although framing 
effects are a fairly robust phenomenon among adults, and have been used in many practical 
decision making domains including medical and financial decision making, not all adolescents 
and young adults are susceptible to framing effects. Thus, as practitioners work with adolescents 
and emerging adults, they should pay attention to this individual difference and use the most 
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appropriate method of intervention for individuals to help make sound decisions in risky 
situations.   
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APPENDIX A: TABLES 
Table A-1 
 
Percentage of Participants Showing Preference Shifts and Lenient Interpretation of Preference 
Reversals by Age Group  
 
 
 
 
 
Note: A preference shift is defined more risky choices in loss frames than in the gain frames at 
composite level (i.e., across all 8 scenarios). A lenient reversal is when a participant selects the 
sure option in most of the gain frames (i.e., 3 or 4 out of 4) and also selects the risky option in the 
most of the loss frames (i.e., 3 or 4 out of 4).   
 
 
 
Preference 
shifts 
Lenient 
reversals 
9th grade (n = 53) 43.40% 39.60% 
12th grade (n = 30) 26.70% 36.70% 
Younger emerging adults (n = 31) 58.10% 67.70% 
Older emerging adults (n = 40) 45.00% 42.50% 
Total (n = 154) 43.50% 45.50% 
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Table A-2 
 
Trichotomized scores for Rational Thinking and Experiential Thinking for Each Age Group 
 
 
Rational Thinking Experiential Thinking 
  
low middle high low middle high 
9th grade range 1.8-3.0 3.2-3.8 4.0-4.7 1.8-3.4 3.5-3.8 3.9-4.3 
 
n 19 17 17 21 14 18 
12th grade range 2.4-3.4 3.5-3.8 4.0-5.0 2.6-3.6 3.7-3.9 4.0-4.9 
 
n 11 7 12 12 11 7 
Younger emerging 
adults range 1.6-2.9 3.1-3.8 4.0-4.5 2.8-3.5 3.6-4.0 4.1-5.0 
  n 10 12 9 9 10 12 
Older emerging adults range 2.4-3.2 3.4-4.0 4.1-4.9 2.4-3.5 3.6-3.9 4.0-5.0 
 
n 13 14 13 13 13 14 
Note: Scores can range between 1 and 5 
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Table A-3 
 
Trichotomized Scores for Neuroticism for Each Age Group 
 
Neuroticism 
  
low middle high 
9th grade range 1.0-2.25 2.5-3.0 3.25-5.0 
 
n 15 21 17 
12th grade range 1.0-2.25 2.5-3.0 3.25-5.0 
 
n 10 12 8 
Younger emerging adults range 1.0-2.5 2.75-3.25 3.5-5.0 
  n 10 12 9 
Older emerging adults range 1.0-2.75 3.0 3.25-5.0 
 
n 11 13 16 
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Table A-4 
 
Trichotomized Scores for Openness to Experience, Functional and Dysfunctional Impulsivity 
  
low middle high 
Openness to Experience range 1.0-2.25 2.5-3.0 3.25-5.0 
 
n 61 53 40 
Functional Impulsivity range 0-4 5-7 8-10 
 
n 59 56 39 
Dysfunctional Impulsivity range 0-2 3-5 6-12 
  n 67 42 45 
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Table A-5 
 
Repeated Measure ANOVAs for Experiential Thinking (REI-E) 
Effect SS df MS F 
 
η2 
Between-subjects 
Group    .110 1 .110 .035  .000 REI-E 3.401 2 1.701 .537  .007 Group x REI-E 21.041 2 10.520 3.325*  .043 Error 468.262 148 3.164       
Within-subjects             
Frame 60.378 1 60.378 46.726**  .240 Frame x Group 5.279 1 5.279 4.085*  .027 Frame x REI-E .115 2 .057 .044  .001 Frame x Group x REI-E .006 2 .003 .002  .000 Error 191.242 148 1.292       
Note: * p < .05.; ** p < .01. 
  
55 
Table A-6 
 
Repeated Measure ANOVAs for Rational Thinking (REI-R) 
Effect SS df MS F 
 
η2 
Between-subjects             
Group .378 1 .378 .118  .001 REI-R 7.660 2 3.830 1.192  .016 Group4 x REI-R 8.725 2 4.362 1.358  .018 Error 475.353 148 3.212       
Within-subjects             
Frame 58.611 1 58.611 50.222**  .253 Frame x Group 5.427 1 5.427 4.651*  .030 Frame x REI-R 2.292 2 1.146 .982  .013 Frame x Group x REI-R 17.433 2 8.717 7.469*  .092 Error 172.723 148 1.167       
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01. 
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APPENDIX B: FIGURES 
Problem 1 (Gain frame): Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual 
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the 
disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of 
the programs is as follows:  
     If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. (Sure option) 
     If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 
probability that no people will be saved. (Risky/Probabilistic option)  
Which of the two programs would you favor? 
The second problem is exactly the same cover story as above, but the outcome choices are 
different: 
Problem 2 (Loss frame):  
     If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. (Sure option) 
     If Program D is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and a 2/3 probability 
that 600 people will die. (Risky/Probabilistic option) 
Which of the two programs would you favor? 
 
Figure B-1. The original Asian Disease Problem from Tversky and Kahneman (1981). 
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Figure B-2. The number of risky choices in the gain and loss frame for each age group. Number 
of risky choices can vary between 0 and 4. 
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 Figure B-3. Percentage of students showing the framing effect on the Asian Disease Problem 
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Figure B-4.1 Mean number of risky choices for high school students as a function of three levels 
of Experiential Thinking score and Frames. Number of risky choices can vary between 0 and 4. 
 
 
Figure B-4.2 Mean number of risky choices college students as a function of three levels of 
Experiential Thinking score and Frames. Number of risky choices can vary between 0 and 4. 
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Figure B-5. Number of risky choices as a function of experiential thinking style and age group.  
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Figure B-6.1 Mean number of risky choices for high school students as a function of three levels of 
Rational Thinking score and Frames. Number of risky choices can vary between 0 and 4. 
 
Figure B-6.2 Mean number of risky choices for college students as a function of three levels of Rational 
Thinking score and Frames. Number of risky choices can vary between 0 and 4. 
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APPENDIX C: ASIAN DISEASE PROBLEM AND MODIFIED ADOLESCENT-RELEVANT 
VERSIONS 
The following section includes a number of situations in which you are asked to make a decision. 
Please read each individual situation carefully, and choose the option which you prefer. There 
are no right or wrong answers. 
 
Version 1 Gain Frame (V1G) – Classic Asian Disease Problem in the Grain Frame 
Imagine that the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected 
to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. 
Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: 
Program A: 200 people will be saved. 
Program B: 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved and 2/3 probability that nobody 
will be saved. 
Which of the two programs (A or B) do you favor? _____ 
 
Version 1 Loss Frame (V1L) – Classic Asian Disease Problem in the Loss Frame 
Imagine that the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected 
to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. 
Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: 
Program A: 400 people will die. 
Program B: 1/3 probability that nobody will die and 2/3 probability that 600 people will 
die. 
Which of the two programs (A or B) do you favor? _____ 
 
Version 2 Gain Frame (V2G) – Adolescent-Relevant Version about Sexually Transmitted 
Infection in the Gain Frame 
Imagine that your local health department is preparing for the outbreak of deadly sexually 
transmitted infection (STI), which is expected to affect 400 teenagers. Two alternative programs 
to combat the STI have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the 
consequences of the programs are as follows: 
Program A: 100 teenagers will be protected against the STI.  
Program B: 1/4 probability that 400 teenagers will be protected against the STI and 3/4 
probability that no teenagers will be protected. 
Which of the two programs (A or B) do you favor? _____ 
 
Version 2 Loss Frame (V2L) – Adolescent-Relevant Version about Sexually Transmitted 
Infection in the Loss Frame 
Imagine that your local health department is preparing for the outbreak of deadly sexually 
transmitted infection (STI), which is expected to affect 400 teenagers. Two alternative programs 
to combat the STI have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the 
consequences of the programs are as follows: 
Program A: 300 teenagers will be infected by the STI.  
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Program B: 1/4 probability that nobody will be infected by the STI, and 3/4 probability 
that 400 teenagers will be infected by the STI.  
Which of the two programs (A or B) do you favor? _____ 
 
Version 3 Gain Frame (V3G) – Adolescent-Relevant Version about Texting while Driving in the 
Gain Frame 
Statistics indicate that around 4000 teenagers per year are killed or seriously injured in Illinois 
because of texting while driving. Two alternative programs to enforce the law to prevent texting 
while driving have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the 
consequences of the programs are as follows:  
Program A: 1600 teenagers will be saved from death or injury.  
Program B: 2/5 probability that 4000 teenagers will be saved from death or injuries, and 
3/5 probability that no teenagers will be saved from death or injury.  
Which of the two programs (A or B) do you favor? _____ 
 
Version 3 Loss Frame (V3L) – Adolescent-Relevant Version about Texting while Driving in the 
Loss Frame 
Statistics indicate that around 4000 teenagers per year are killed or seriously injured in Illinois 
because of texting while driving. Two alternative programs to enforce the law to prevent texting 
while driving have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the 
consequences of the programs are as follows:  
Program A: 2400 teenagers will be killed or injured.  
Program B: 2/5 probability that nobody will be killed or injured, and 3/5 probability that 
4000 teenagers will be killed or injured.  
Which of the two programs (A or B) do you favor? _____ 
 
Version 4 Gain Frame (V4G) – Adolescent-Relevant Version about Illegal Substances in the 
Gain Frame 
Because of the introduction of highly addictive and lethal drugs (e.g., meth, “bath salts”), 450 
teenagers are killed by overdosing illegal substances in your area every year. Two alternative 
programs to enforce the illegal substance law have been proposed. Assume that the exact 
scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows:  
Program A: 150 teenagers will be saved from death.  
Program B: 1/3 probability that 450 teenagers will be saved from death, and 2/3 
probability that nobody will be saved.  
Which of the two programs (A or B) do you favor? _____ 
 
Version 4 Loss Frame (V4L) – Adolescent-Relevant Version about Illegal Substances in the Loss 
Frame 
Because of the introduction of highly addictive and lethal drugs (e.g., meth, “bath salts”), 450 
teenagers are killed by overdosing illegal substances in your area every year. Two alternative 
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programs to enforce the illegal substance law have been proposed. Assume that the exact 
scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs is as follows:  
Program A: 300 teenagers will die.  
Program B: 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that 450 teenagers 
will die.  
Which of the two programs (A or B) do you favor? _____ 
 
